A Briefing to the UNSC by the current UNSG

Introduction

In my role as Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN) I would like to call the Security Council (UNSC) to order to address the contention of a standing army. A standing army will refer to a force that is ‘forward deployed and prepared to conduct military operations’ (Bertinetti and Bonin 2016) and must be clearly distinguished from existing peacekeepers. There is a struggle between the UN’s responsibility to remain impartial, and preserve the sovereignty of member states, and the responsibility to protect civilians from war and injustice. Ultimately, it is clear that in order to maintain impartiality whilst also protecting the human rights of civilians, the UNSC needs to adopt a preventative approach, rather than a retaliatory approach that would occur if a standing army were to be imposed. I acknowledge past instances whereby the UN has failed to provide adequate response in civil conflict where a standing army could have been beneficial. Upon analysis of key research, I have concluded that a standing army would be detrimental to fulfilling the aims of the UN. Instead I will conclude with how we can improve peacekeeping.

Core Aims

A standing army could infringe on the core aims of the UN where it can no longer operate as an independent actor within the international community. In his 1957 UN Emergency Force report, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold stated that UN intervention, such as peacekeeping missions should not serve as a means to ‘force settlement, in the interest of one party,’ Yamashita (2008, p. 615). As current Secretary-General of the UN, I wish to uphold this notion. Not only would a standing army threaten our role as an impartial institution, it has the potential to infringe upon state sovereignty. We must respect the principle of non-intervention in one other’s internal affairs (Foley, 2017), outlined by the Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648). Should a standing army be imposed, this would interfere with the sovereign rights of member states and could lead to further impacts on the legitimacy of UN authority.

National Interests

• 

A militarised army presents viable concerns that the force could fall under control of states acting with their own national interests in mind. UN intervention in another state’s civil affairs is prohibited, except whereby humanitarian crises are evident. It cannot be guaranteed that ‘unilateral military interventions’ would not be deployed under ‘humanitarian arguments’ (Foley, 2017). We have seen military interventions for the purpose of national growth, masked under ‘humanitarian intervention’ particularly in the Cold War. The U.S and the former USSR instigated various proxy wars under the guise of political protection policies to increase their own sphere of influence. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that states could ‘act in pursuit of their own national interests’ (Korab-Karpowicz 2018) to leverage power over a standing army.

Monetary Issues

The U.N is not in an economic position to provide the funds for establishing and maintaining a standing army. The UN peacekeeping budget stands at $6.7 billion per annum to fund approximately 80,000 troops, where troops provided by states are paid $1428 USD per month (UN Peacekeeping 2018). These peacekeepers are predominantly from third world countries such as Ethiopia, Rwanda and Bangladesh (Rees, 2018). If the UN were to create a standing army comprising of soldiers from strong militaries such as the US, it would have to increase expenditure significantly. In 2016 the U.S accounted for 22% of the UN’s annual budget (Schaefer, 2016). The budget would also need to account for training, equipment, arms supply and support services for soldiers and families. It is unrealistic to impose the additional financial burden of a standing army which could be susceptible to making the same mistakes made by peacekeepers.

Past Peacekeeping Operations

• 

Past failures call into question the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Howard (1999, p. 527) states that the ‘aim of peacekeeping operations is to ‘rebuild the basic institutions of a post-war state so that the warring parties do not return to war.’ However, it is clear that peacekeeping operations have mostly failed to do so. Peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2005 were considered a great success, where disarmament was achieved and ammunition was destroyed (Henderson, 2015). In contrast, one of the most tragic peacekeeping failures was that of Rwanda where more than 800,000 Rwandans lost their lives in the genocide after peacekeepers were withdrawn (Verpoorten, 2005). More recently, in June 2017 the UN announced that 600 peacekeeping troops from Congo Republic who were serving in the Central African Republic would be withdrawn from the mission following allegations of sex abuse and exploitation (Al Jazeera, 2017).

Recommendations

Firstly, there is a clear need for the current peacekeeping operations to be held accountable for instances of mismanagement, in order to increase efficiency. I recommend that policy drafting begins on establishing another body that is solely used for the monitoring and scrutinisation of peacekeepers whilst on the ground. This body then needs to be able to publish accessible, authentic and impartial reports on their findings in order to hold peacekeepers accountable. Individuals must be able to report to these bodies and must be able to propose “issue advisory opinions on how (peacekeeping) missions could do better” (Foley, 2017). To implement a more efficient peacekeeping body, we must be willing to accept scrutiny and to impose strict monitoring systems.

Secondly, the legal framework surrounding how peacekeepers can and cannot be employed needs clarification. Under Article 105 of the UN Charter, “legal immunity is given to UN officials [and] representatives of member states… and all acts performed by them in their official capacity” (Foley 2017, p.219). This is problematic as it does not allow for peacekeepers to be held legally accountable for their actions or inactions whilst on official missions. The UNSC did not accept responsibility in instances “where civilians were killed by members of UNEF… who opened fire without receiving orders…” (Foley 2017, p.221). Former director of the UN’s legal division Oscar Schachter argued that that vague terms about the UN’s willingness to pay compensation is often done in order to avoid setting a precedent (Foley 2017, p.222). I recommend that policy is drafted to encourage the ICJ in setting precedents, to allow for consistency and clarity, which in turn will increase the legitimacy of our international law.

Thirdly, I recommend that policy is drafted to increase female service personnel. There is a history of sexual abuse within peacekeeping. By increasing female personnel, we can try to begin to “combat sexual misconduct perpetrated by some male soldiers.” (Bridges and Horsfall, 2009). Representation of both genders allows for a balanced perspective in solutions, thus improving ‘trust and reputation of peacekeepers among local populations’ (Bridges and Horsfall, 2009). I recommend female participation is increased in all areas of peacekeeping.

Ultimately, there is a clear need for the better management and guidance of peacekeepers. This attention to creating a standing army for the UN would be better directed in strengthening the current peacekeeping.

Reference List

Al Jazeera, 2017, ‘Congo peacekeepers accused of sex abuse to leave CAR,’  22 June, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/congo-peacekeepers-accused-sex-abuse-leave-car-170622011227682.html>

Bealuac S. 2004, The Australian Legal Journal, The Westphalian Model in Defending  International Law: Challenging the Myth, vol 9, p. 1.

Bertinetti, S. & Bonin, J.A. 2016, ‘Searching for the Greatest Generation’s Army in 1950’, in Warren, J.W. (ed.), Drawdown, NYU Press, p. 175-187.

Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992, An Agenda for Peace, p. 41-62.

Bridges, D. and Horsfall, D. (2009). Increasing Operational Effectiveness in UN Peacekeeping. Armed Forces & Society, 36(1), p.120-130.

Charter of the United Nations, 1945

Foley, C. (2017). UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Protection of Civilians. Cambridge University Press.

Henderson, B. 2015, ‘What have been the successes and failures of UN peacekeeping missions?’, Telegraph, 28 September, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/11729436/Srebrenica-20-years-on-What-have-been-the-successes-and-failures-of-UN-peacekeeping-missions.html>

Herro, A. 2018 (22 March 2018), The Quest for a United Nations Standing Army, Oxford Research Group, 25/03/2019, https://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/the-quest-for-a-united-nations-standing-army

House of Representatives Committee, 2000, A United Nations Standing Army, viewed 27/03/2019, PDF http://www.aphref.aph.gov.au_house_committee_jfadt_u_nations_unchap4%20(3).pdf

Howard, L. 2002, ‘Why Peacekeeping Fails by Dennis Jett: Reviewed by Lisa Morje Howard’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, no. 2, p. 527-530.

Korab-Karpowicz,  W.J. 2017, ‘Political Realism in International Relations’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer 2018 Edition), Zalta, E.N. (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=realism-intl-relations

Rees, M. 2018, ‘How Much Does a UN Soldier Cost’, BBC News, 15 February, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43046554>.

Schaefer, B. (2016). United Nations Peacekeeping Flaws and Abuses: The U.S. Must Demand Reform. The Heritage Foundation. Available at: https://www.heritage.org/report/united-nations-peacekeeping-flaws-and-abuses-the-us-must-demand-reform

United Nations Peacekeeping 2018, How we are Funded, United Nations, viewed 29 March 2019, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/how-we-are-funded>.

United Nations Secretariat 2018, Assessment of Member States Contributions to the United Nations Regular Budget for the Year 2019, United Nations, viewed 28 March 2019, <https://undocs.org/en/ST/ADM/SER.B/992>.

Verpoorten, M. 2005, ‘The Death Toll of the Rwandan Genocide: A Detailed Analysis for Gikongoro Province,’ Population: English Edition, vol. 60 no. 4, p. 331-367.

Winfield, L. 1999 ‘UN Failed Rwanda,’ Associated Press, Dec 16, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/201-rwanda/39240.html>.

Yamashita, H. 2008, ‘Impartial’ use of force in United Nations Peacekeeping, International Peacekeeping, vol15, no.5, p. 615.